THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SHOOTING OF “HEAVENLY HUNDRED” Dear compatriots! I have repeatedly said — and not...

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SHOOTING OF “HEAVENLY HUNDRED”

Dear compatriots!
I have repeatedly said — and not only I — that the shooting of people on Maidan was planned and perpetrated not by “Berkut” and not by the order of Yanukovich. A third party acted. And this third party is clearly supported by the current government. Still there was not a comparative examination of bullets by which have been killed and “Berkut”-fighters, and the Maidan protesters. 
Similarly, the authority has acted to conceal and destroy evidences after the events of the second of May in Odessa. This has been stated by international experts: http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/935265-V-OON-raskritik.. 
I offer to your attention one of the reports of mass murders on the Maidan from a scientist from the University of Ottawa Ivan Katchanovski. 

1
The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine
1
Ivan Katchanovski, Ph.D.
School of Political Studies 
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, ON
K1N 6N5, Canada
ikatchan@uottawa.ca
Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association 
in San Francisco, September 3-6, 2015
“Il est défendu de tuer; tout meurtrier est puni, à moins qu’il n’ait tué en grande compagnie, et 
au son des trompettes; c’est la règle.”[It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are 
punished unless they kill in large numbers and to the sound of trumpets; it is the rule].
1
(Voltaire).
1
Earlier version of this paper was presented at the Chair of Ukrainian Studies Seminar at the 
University of Ottawa, Ottawa, October 1, 2014. 
2
Abstract
The massacre of almost 50 Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 was a turning point 
in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the conflict between the West and Russia over 
Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it 
led to the overthrow of the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a 
civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in Crimea and Donbas, and 
an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine. A conclusion promoted by 
the post-Yanukovych governments and the media in Ukraine that the massacre was perpetrated 
by government snipers and special police units on a Yanukovych order has been nearly 
universally accepted by the Western governments, the media, and many scholars. The Ukrainian 
government investigation identified members of the special company of Berkut as responsible 
for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters, but did not release any evidence in support, 
with the exception of videos of the massacre. 
The question is which side organized the “snipers’ massacre.” This paper is the first 
academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing. It uses a theory of rational choice and a 
Weberian theory of instrumental rationality to examine actions of major actors both from the 
Yanukovych government, specifically various police and security forces, and the Maidan 
opposition, specifically its far right and oligarchic elements, during the massacre. 
The paper analyzes a large amount of evidence from different publicly available sources 
concerning this massacre and killings of specifics protestors. Qualitative content analysis 
includes the following data: about 1,500 videos and recordings of live internet and TV 
broadcasts in mass media and social media in different countries (some 150 gigabytes), news 
reports and social media posts by more than 100 journalists covering the massacre from Kyiv, 
some 5,000 photos, and nearly 30 gigabytes of publicly available radio intercepts of snipers and 
commanders from the special Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine and Internal Troops, 
and Maidan massacre trial recordings. This study also employs field research on site of the 
massacre, eyewitness reports by both Maidan protesters and government special units 
commanders, statements by both former and current government officials, estimates of 
approximate ballistic trajectories, bullets and weapons used, and types of wounds among both 
protesters and the police. This study establishes a precise timeline for various events of the 
massacre, the locations of both the shooters and the government snipers, and the specific timeline 
and locations of nearly 50 protesters’ deaths. It also briefly analyzes other major cases of 
violence during and after the “Euromaidan.”
This academic investigation concludes that the massacre was a false flag operation, 
which was rationally planned and carried out with a goal of the overthrow of the government and 
seizure of power. It found various evidence of the involvement of an alliance of the far right 
organizations, specifically the Right Sector and Svoboda, and oligarchic parties, such as 
Fatherland. Concealed shooters and spotters were located in at least 20 Maidan-controlled 
buildings or areas. The various evidence that the protesters were killed from these locations
include some 70 testimonies, primarily by Maidan protesters, several videos of “snipers” 
targeting protesters from these buildings, comparisons of positions of the specific protesters at 
the time of their killing and their entry wounds, and bullet impact signs. The study uncovered 
various videos and photos of armed Maidan “snipers” and spotters in many of these buildings. 
The paper presents implications of these findings for understanding the nature of the change of 
the government in Ukraine, the civil war in Donbas, Russian military intervention in Crimea and 
Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine.  
3
The “Snipers’” Massacre Question
The massacre of several dozen Maidan protesters on February 20, 2014 represented a 
turning point in Ukrainian politics and a tipping point in the escalating conflict between the West 
and Russia over Ukraine. In particular, the mass killing of the protesters and mass shooting of the 
police that preceded it led to the violent overthrow of the semi-democratic government of Viktor 
Yanukovych, who was backed by the Russian government, by a Maidan alliance of oligarchic 
and far right parties, supported by the Western governments. This massacre also gave a start to a 
large-scale violent conflict that escalated into a civil war in Donbas and to and Russian military 
intervention in Crimea and Donbas. The conclusion promoted by the post-Yanukovych 
governments and the Ukrainian media that the massacre was carried out by government snipers 
on a Yanukovych order has been nearly universally shared, at least publicly, by the US and other 
Western governments, as well as the media in Ukraine and the West before any investigation 
conducted and all evidence considered.
2
For instance, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, in 
his speech to the US Congress on September 18, 2014, stated that the Yanukovych government’s 
overthrow resulted from mass peaceful protests against police violence, in particular the killings 
of more than 100 protesters by snipers on February 20, 2014.
3
The research question is which side was involved in the “snipers’ massacre.” Related 
questions include which side broke the truce agreement and killed and wounded protesters and 
police, and whether this was this was a spontaneous or organized massacre. This paper is the first 
academic study of this crucial case of the mass killing that led to the escalation of the violent 
conflict in Ukraine, an overthrow of the government and ultimately a civil war in Donbas, 
Russian military intervention in Donbas and Crimea, and the annexation of Crimea.
4
The next section of this paper reviews different narratives concerning the Maidan 
massacre by the governments and the media in Ukraine, the West, and Russia, results of the 
official investigation and a trial, and representations of this mass killing in previous academic 
studies. The second section presents a theoretical framework used in this study and evidence and 
research methods that it employs. The next two sections analyze, respectively, the mass 
shootings of the police and Maidan protesters. A brief analysis of other major cases of violence 
during and after the “Euromaidan” is followed by conclusion, summarizing main findings of this 
paper and their implications.
Narratives, Investigations, and Previous Studies of the Maidan Massacre 
The governments and mainstream media in the West generally accepted the Maidan 
narrative of the “snipers’ massacre” as being perpetrated by the government forces on 
Yanukovych’s order, with a possible Russian government involvement, but did not provide 
evidence of such involvement. These conclusions were mainly based on the manifest content of 
videos and media reports on the Berkut special company firing live ammunition at unarmed 
protesters and the absence of similar evidence for armed groups of protesters. The dominant 
representation of the massacre by governments and the media in the West and Ukraine is a part 
of the narrative presenting “Euromaidan” as a democratic, peaceful mass-protest movement and 
a revolution led by pro-Western parties. The role of far-right parties and organizations, such as 
Svoboda and the Right Sector, is regarded as marginal. The same concerns violence by the 
Maidan side. Such violence and the presence of arms were represented as marginal, or as in the 
case of the December 1, 2013, attack of the presidential administration, which was often
attributed to provocateurs. In a leaked intercepted telephone call with the EU foreign affairs 
chief, the Estonian minister of foreign affairs referred to one of the Maidan doctors, in particular 
4
Olha Bohomolets, pointing to similarity of the wounds among the protesters and policemen, 
which served as an indication that the massacre was organized by some elements of the Maidan 
opposition.
5
However, EU states and the US government showed little interest in an international 
investigation of this mass killing and did not release their intelligence assessments and other 
information that they reportedly have concerning this case. 
In contrast, the Russian government and media, as well as ex-president Yanukovych and 
his top officials, who fled to Russia following the massacre, generally presented the mass killing 
of the police and protesters as a part of fascist coup organized by radical elements of the Maidan 
opposition and the US government, with help from the Central Intelligence Agency. However, 
they have not offered any evidence in support of such claims. But the Russian security services 
likely intercepted a telephone call between the EU foreign affairs chief and the Estonian foreign 
affairs minister who discussed evidence that this massacre was staged by some elements of the 
Maidan opposition.
Previous academic studies only briefly examined the Maidan massacre. A book-length 
study of “Euromaidan” offered a generally standard narrative of the massacre and attributes the 
killings to the government police and security forces, but it also cites a leader of Spilna sprava, a 
Maidan organization, as saying that one of the snipers was killed at the Hotel Ukraina (Wilson, 
2104, 88-90). Many scholars, like the governments and mass media in Ukraine and the West, 
dismissed as “conspiracy theories” that do not require specific research various accounts of the 
Maidan massacre as a false flag operation (see, for example, Yekelchyk, 2015, 108-113). In 
contrast, some scholars suggested that a theory of the massacre as a false flag operation carried 
out by elements of the Maidan opposition cannot be dismissed and needs to be researched (see, 
for instance, Sakwa, 2015, 90-92). Some scholars concluded that the far right, specifically, the 
Right Sector, was involved in the Maidan massacre or that the Maidan opposition was involved 
in this massacre (Katchanovski, 2015, 2016; Hahn, 2015; Wade, 2015, 365). 
The “Euromaidan” and the change of the government were generally represented in 
academic studies as a popular movement, which turned into a revolution, and which was 
motivated political protest against the authoritarian government, specially its reliance on 
violence, and by support of integration of Ukraine into the European Union. Many scholars also 
attributed violent attacks of the presidential administration and the parliament as response to the 
government violence and political repressions or as provocations by the Yanukovych 
government or Russia. They regarded the role of the far right organizations during the Maidan as 
insignificant or marginal. (See, for example, Marples and Mills, 2015; Popova, 2014; Wilson, 
2014). Killings of Armenian, Georgian, Jewish, and Polish protesters and the presence of the 
Right Sector during funeral of Oleksander Shcherbaniuk, a Jewish protester, were mentioned in 
about dozen stories in major US, Israeli, and Scandinavian media as an evidence of the diversity 
of the protesters, their massacre by the government snipers, and tolerant or moderate nature of 
Right Sector, an alliance of radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations.
6
The Maidan-led government used the Maidan massacre as a source of its legitimacy and 
widely commemorated this mass killing and its victims among the protesters. The killed 
protesters were posthumously awarded Hero of Ukraine titles by President Petro Poroshenko,
and the government established February 20 as a day in their honor. A large group of 
investigators was specifically tasked with solving this massacre case, and their investigation 
involved the interrogations of more than 2,000 people and more than 1,000 ballistic, medical and 
other expert reports. Therefore, it appeared irrational that the official government investigation—
5
for a year and a half since the massacre—failed to reveal much of basic evidence and to bring 
any convictions in such a crucial case. 
The investigation of the “snipers’ massacre” by the Prosecutor General Office in Ukraine 
and by other government agencies, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security 
Service of Ukraine, concluded that commanders and members of a special Berkut company 
killed 39 out of the 49 protesters who died on February 20. The investigators announced that this 
was done by this police unit primarily with AKM assault rifles and with hunting ammunition 
used in their pump rifles, even thought it would have been irrational to use such ammunition 
because it was unfamiliar and less powerful and precise than their standard Kalashnikov rifles of 
7.62mm caliber. The head of the special parliamentary commission reported that out of 76 
protesters killed on February 18-20, at least 25 were killed with 7.62mm caliber bullets and at 
least 17 protesters were killed with pellets, while one was shot dead by a 9mm bullet from a 
Makarov handgun.
7
However, the Prosecutor General Office found that 67 out of 77 protesters 
were killed with firearms and 181 wounded with firearms during the entire “Euromaidan,” 
including 49 shot dead on February 20, 2014. It reported that one out of 39 protesters that the 
prosecution charged the special Berkut police unit with killing on February 20 was shot with 
pellets, while 7.62mm bullets of AKM caliber were extracted from bodies of 16 protesters. The 
prosecution also reported that there were protesters killed with hunting bullets, but not specified 
their number. It has not been revealed publicly which ammunition killed which protesters, with 
some exceptions during the trial of two Berkut policemen.
8
While many Maidan politicians and the Ukrainian media initially claimed that 
government snipers from the Alfa unit of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) massacred 
many protesters, the Maidan government investigation produced no evidence that they had shot 
protesters. In the beginning of April 2013, the Prosecutor General Office issued a statement that 
a Simonov “sniper rifle” was used in the Hotel Ukraina to shoot protesters, even though the 
Simonov rifle is not a sniper rifle but a semi-automatic carbine that uses the same caliber bullets 
as the AKM; the Simonov was generally removed from military and police service in Ukraine 
and was available as a hunting rifle. However, during the first press conference presenting the 
investigation’s results in April 2014 the Prosecutor General, from the far-right Svoboda party, 
did not mention that the Simonov carbine was used and that any “snipers” were in this hotel. The 
same was done in November 2014 at the subsequent press conference by the Prosecutor General 
Office when it was headed by a Fatherland member.
9
A new head of the investigation, reported 
the same findings concerning the Berkut involvement but admitted that there might have been 
unknown non-governmental snipers who shot some protesters from the Hotel Ukraina.
10
The Berkut special company’s commander and two members of his unit were arrested in 
2014 and the deputy commander of the Berkut regiment in 2015, and they were charged with 
killing 39 protesters. It appeared irrational that the purported killers would remain in Kyiv and 
not hide from the prosecution. It was similarly puzzling that the Berkut special company 
commander was then released and he disappeared. A trial of two policemen from a Berkut 
special company began in January 2015. The trial proceedings and statements by lawyers of the 
two arrested Berkut members revealed that the 71-volume investigative file did not identify 
specific protesters killed by specific Berkut members. The evidence against the policemen relied 
on their presence in the area of the massacre based on mobile phones records and on videos of 
masked Berkut members shooting during the massacre. The investigation established the place of 
the shooting for only half of these 39 protesters.
11
6
The list of the 39 protesters whose killing the prosecution attributed to Berkut was only 
made public during the trial of the two Berkut members almost 1 year and a half after the 
massacre. Official results from the ballistic, weapons, and medical examinations and other 
evidence collected during the government’s investigation of this massacre have not been made 
public until the trial proceedings started in July 2015.
The top Maidan government leaders claimed that Yanukovych and his top officials in the 
SBU and Ministry of Internal Affairs organized the massacre. However, no such evidence was 
provided. Interrogations of Yanukovych government officials who did not flee, as well as of 
police commanders and members, produced no confessions or witness testimonies about such an 
order or about the involvement of the Berkut and other such formations in the massacre of the 
protesters. The prosecution stated during the Maidan massacre trial that after an unspecified 
escalation of the conflict around 8am on February 20, the Berkut commander himself ordered the 
commander of the special Berkut company to disperse the protesters on the Maidan and block 
them from advancing to the parliament and presidential administration. It would have been 
irrational for the Berkut commander to issue such an order on his own and use only about two 
dozen members of a special company to disperse the Maidan. The prosecution stated that 
president Viktor Yanukovych and the Minister of Internal Affairs ordered to disperse the 
protesters on the Maidan by force close to midnight on February 18 after the deadly clashes 
during a “march” of the Maidan protesters, including Maidan Self-Defense units, to the 
parliament on February 18. The prosecution charged that following a Berkut commander order, 
the Berkut special company commander ordered to use AKMs and Fort 500 pump guns with lead 
pellets, but no specific evidence was presented concerning these orders.
12
The prosecution claimed that around 9:00am on February 20, 2014 unidentified persons of 
unknown allegiance started to shoot at the police, and that they killed from an unknown weapon 
one member of the Berkut special company and wounded another. In response to this, the 
accused from the Berkut company and unidentified members of this company and other law 
enforcement units became hostile to protesters and started to shoot in the direction of the 
unarmed protesters with AKMS and Fort 500 with lead pellets in order to kill them.
The head of the Security Service of Ukraine alleged in February 2015 that Vladislav 
Surkov, an aide of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was personally coordinating foreign 
"snipers" on the Maidan but presented no supporting evidence. The claims about Surkov's 
involvement in the Maidan massacre were also made on the first anniversary of this mass killing 
by President Poroshenko and Oleksander Turchynov, the Head of the National Security and 
Defense Council, and they were disseminated by the media in Ukraine and the West. However, a 
member of the Poroshenko's faction in the parliament and the former Ukrainska pravda journalist 
revealed that Surkov arrived in Kyiv by plane only in the evening of February 20 after the 
massacre was over.
13
The Prosecutor General stated in his interview in April 2015 that he did not 
have any information about Surkov's involvement. The head of it unit in charge of the Maidan 
massacre investigative stated that the investigation did not have any evidence of such 
involvement and that the documents submitted by the SBU head in support of his claims were in 
fact unrelated to the massacre.
14
Similarly, Andrii Parubii, who became after the overthrow of Yanukovych the head of 
the National Security and Defense Council and then the first deputy head of the Ukrainian 
parliament, claimed that Russian and Belarusian snipers massacred the protesters and that they 
were located on the roofs of the presidential administration, the National Bank, but he was not 
certain if they were in the Hotel Ukraine.
15
Oleksander Yakymenko, who headed SBU under 
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Yanukovych, alleged that shooters in addition to the Maidan protestors included hired shooters
from Ukraine and snipers from foreign countries, such as the former Yugoslavia. A retired 
Georgian general claimed that Georgian snipers linked to Mikheil Saakashvili, ex-president of 
Georgia, and senior members of his party and the government were involved in the Maidan 
massacre.
16
Janusz Korwin-Mikke, a Polish presidential candidate alleged that Maidan snipers 
were trained in Poland.
17
However, none of these politicians provided any evidence in support of 
their claims. And no such reliable evidence has been provided by the governments and the media 
in Ukraine, Western countries, and Russia.
On November 19, 2014, the Prosecutor General Office claimed during its press-conference 
devoted to this issue that their extensive investigation produced no evidence of “snipers” at the 
Hotel Ukraina, Zhovtnevyi Palace and other locations controlled by the Maidan protesters. 
Crucial evidence, including catalogues of Berkut’s bullets and weapons and those of other police 
units, as well as some 200 investigative cases of specific victims of the massacre, either 
disappeared or were destroyed under the post-Yanukovych government.
18
The Ukrainian 
government failed to investigate the killing and wounding of policemen on February 20 and on 
two previous days.
The delayed trial of two Berkut members in the Maidan massacre case in July and August 
2015 produced important revelations that unraveled the prosecution case but were not reported 
by the Ukrainian and Western media. For example, a brother of Andrii Saienko testified that this 
protester was killed not from a Berkut position but from a top floor of the Hotel Ukraina 
The prosecutors and relatives of some of the victims stated during the trial that expert reports in 
the investigative file established that Saienko and at least 9 other protesters were killed from the 
same exact 7.62mm caliber weapon. Saienko’s brother and his lawyer said that they in October 
2014 officially handed to investigators a video showing a crucial moment of the killing, which 
along with directions of his wounds pointed to shooters at the hotel, but the prosecution charged 
two Berkut members with the killings of Saienko and other these protesters. 
Lawyers representing these two Berkut policemen stated in court on August 3d, 2015 that 
the prosecution case was falsified and that relatives of victims should ask Andrii Parubii and 
Petro Poroshenko about those who gave an order to massacre protesters, Parubii was the leader 
of neo-Nazi Patriot of Ukraine in the 1990s and the head of the Maidan Self-Defense during the 
“Euromaidan,” and he is presently the first deputy head of the Ukrainian parliament. Poroshenko, 
who is currently president of Ukraine, was one of “Euromaidan” leaders. As an example, a 
defense lawyer said that the prosecution case mentioned an eyewitness, who repeatedly stated 
that he saw a sniper shooting from the second floor of the Hotel Ukraina and killing Serhii 
Kemsky a few meters away from this protester. But the prosecution and its on-site reconstruction 
report ignored this testimony and a medical expert report in the case and stated that Kemsky was 
killed by Berkut without any justification or any other witnesses provided.
19
A report of the International Advisory Panel, set up by the Council of Europe, presented 
in 2015 evidence that the investigation of the “snipers' massacre” on the Maidan has been stalled, 
in particular by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General office. The report 
revealed that contrary to the public statements, the official investigation had evidence of 
“shooters" killing at least three protesters from the Maidan-controlled Hotel Ukraina or the 
Music Conservatory and that at least other 10 protesters were killed by unidentified “snipers” 
from rooftops. The prosecution charges against the Berkut policemen for killing 39 protesters 
simply omitted the killings of the other 10 protesters, even though at least 8 of them they were 
shot dead at the same time and place. However, the Council of Europe commission, which did 
8
not conduct its own investigation, repeated the official investigation conclusions that Berkut 
policemen were responsible for killings of the absolute majority of the protesters.
20
A Reuters 
investigation uncovered that the prosecution case against three Berkut members primarily relied 
on videos and photos and that some key pieces of such evidence were misrepresented or 
ignored.
21
A report by Euromaidan SOS, other Maidan organizations, and lawyers of the killed 
protesters in June 2015 also concluded that the government investigation was ineffective and was 
stonewalled. This report named three protesters, whom the government investigation determined 
as being likely killed from the Hotel Ukraina or surrounding buildings.
22
The government 
investigators did not make public the names of these protesters, and stated that they were killed 
by unidentified shooters, They suggested that the investigation only considers government forces 
or the “third force” as these unidentified shooters and excludes any possibility that they were 
Maidan “snipers.” Similarly, the prosecution charges announced during the Massacre trial 
referred to all Maidan protesters as unarmed and peaceful, and to shooters of the police as 
unidentified persons of unknown affiliation.
23
Monitor, a German TV program, presented in 2014 evidence of its investigation showing 
that shooters were based in the Hotel Ukraina and that the government investigation was 
manipulated.
24
Investigative reports by the BBC and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung almost a 
year after the massacre confirmed the presence of armed protesters at the Music Conservatory 
and their shooting of the police at Maidan.
25
A New York Times investigation concluded that the 
police forces and Yanukovych himself fled because of their fear that protesters could use 
weapons that were seized during the attacks on the police and SBU headquarters in several 
regions of Western Ukraine.
26
However, they did not produce similar investigations into the 
killings of the protesters and assumed that the police massacred the protesters in reaction to the 
killing of the policemen. Similarly, the Daily Beast reports that presented videos and photos of 
the armed SBU Alfa unit are proof that the Alfa snipers killed the protesters, even though the 
photos and videos were made at the SBU headquarters after the massacre had already unfolded.
27
A book by a pro-Maidan Ukrainian journalist concluded that the Maidan massacre was organized 
by Yanukovych aides and carried out by the government units, but it mostly relied on results of 
government investigation and interviews with Maidan politicians (See Koshkina, 2015).
Interpol rejected the Ukrainian government’s requests to put ex-president Viktor 
Yanukovych, a number of his ministers, and the commander and members of the Berkut special 
company on its wanted list on murder-related charges for the Maidan massacre because these 
charges were deemed to be political.”
28
While the Ukrainian Parliament asked the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the massacre and other cases of violence during 
“Euromaidan” following the overthrow of Yanukovych, the Ukrainian Prosecutor General Office 
reportedly informed the court representatives in the fall of 2014 that Ukraine was not interested 
in assisting such an investigation. Based on its statutes—which are limited to genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity—and the previous cases pursued or not pursued by the ICC, 
it is unlikely that the ICC would pursue this case and prosecute those responsible for the 
“snipers’ massacre.”
An edited version of a BBC interview with Yanukovych was misrepresented by BBC 
and the Ukrainian media as an admission of his and his police forces responsibility for carrying 
out the Maidan massacre. However, the transcript of the full Yanukovych interview published on 
the BBC Russian website shows that he did not admit his and his police forces responsibility for 
9
carrying the Maidan massacre and repeated his previous statements about a “coup” by "radicals" 
but regretted his failure to prevent the massacre.
29
One of the main reasons that the Maidan massacre was attributed to snipers is because 
protesters with firearms experience distinguished “whip-like” rifle shots from Kalashnikov shots 
by their sound. But the Council of Europe report noted that the Ukrainian government 
investigation failed even with help of specialized equipment to distinguish rifle and AK shots 
heard in videos. The government investigation claimed that the problem was poor sound quality 
in videos of the massacre. The Prosecutor General of Ukraine from the far right Svoboda party 
stated in June 2014 that he gave videos of the Maidan massacre to the FBI to enhance their 
quality.
30
But that results of such an involvement of the FBI in the Maidan massacre 
investigation have not been made public.
But the version of Maidan shooters was not pursued by the official investigation, and 
top Maidan leaders were not interrogated concerning the Maidan massacre. For instance, this 
concerned Andrii Parubii.
31
The Maidan leaders, in particular Parubii, denied that the killed and 
wounded protesters received any orders to advance or that any Maidan formations were armed 
and shot at the police, with the exceptions of some who were openly carrying pellet guns and 
hunting rifles. Moreover, they denied or questioned that that any “snipers” were in the Hotel 
Ukraina, Music Conservatory, or the Trade Union headquarters, or that these buildings were 
controlled by Maidan during the massacre. Ukrainian Maidan politicians and the Ukrainian 
media have often inflated the number of victims of the Maidan massacre on February 20 and 
referred to the “heavenly hundred” of killed protesters, even after the official investigation 
confirmed that 49 protesters died on that day.
Theoretical Framework
This study relies on the rational choice theoretical framework and the Weberian theory of 
rational action, and it employs interpretative and content analyses of a variety of sources. The 
rational choice theory views people as acting in a calculated and self-interested manner, and this 
theory was applied for various specific political events (See, for example, Bates, Greif, Levi, 
Rosenthal, and Weingas, 1998). However, rational choice assumes that people have perfect 
information to make such decisions and that all of their actions are rational. In contrast, the 
Weberian theory of social action regards instrumentally-rational type of action as one ideal type 
of action alongside value-rational, traditional and affectual types of action, and that such actions 
can be interpreted and understood by scholars. The instrumentally rational type of action 
involves “the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends.” (Weber, 
1978, 24-25).
However, the widely accepted narrative of the massacre appears irrational from both 
rational choice and Weberian instrumentally rational action perspectives. Yanukovych and his 
associates lost all of their power and much of their wealth, and fled from Ukraine as a result of 
this mass killing, since this massacre of protesters undermined his and his government’s 
legitimacy, even among the many deputies of his Party of Regions who joined the opposition and 
voted to remove him from the presidency. The same problem concerns the irrational retreat of 
the police from their position at Maidan and the mass killing of the protesters by the police, since 
Berkut and the internal troop units had nonlethal weapons to stop unarmed protesters and it was 
more rational to use live ammunition or snipers to deliver warning shots or target armed 
protesters and the Maidan leaders, rather than to kill advancing protesters. Similarly, the repeated 
attempts by protesters to advance on the very small and relatively unimportant part of Instytutska ………

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